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ESSAY
BLACKNESS AS FIGHTING WORDS
Etienne C. Toussaint*
“It’s in they job description to terminate the threat / So 41 shots to the body is
what he can expect.” — Talib Kweli, The Proud1
“I believe that this nation can only heal from the wounds of racism if we all
begin to love blackness. . . . That which is best within us, . . . that which is
faltering, which is wounded, which is contradictory, incomplete.” — bell
hooks2

INTRODUCTION
Where I grew up, the wrong words could turn an innocent sparring
match of playground taunts and after-school gibes into a full-out asphalt
brawl. Naïve boys enacting popular tropes of Black hypermasculinity, 3
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke
School of Law. I thank colleagues who provided comments and feedback on this Essay,
including Philip Lee, Diane Klein, Khaled Beydoun, Mae Quinn, Brandon Hasbrouck, Diego
Alcala, Joshua P. Fershée, and Kathleen Hoke. I also thank Sabrin Qadi, Stephanie Kamey,
and Bradley Cunningham for research assistance. Any errors or omissions contained in this
Essay are my own.
1 Talib Kweli, The Proud, on Quality (Rawkus Records 2002).
2 Melvin McLeod, “There’s No Place To Go But Up”—bell hooks and Maya Angelou in
Conversation, Lion’s Roar (Jan. 1, 1998), https://hlionsroar.com/theres-no-place-to-go-butup/ [https://perma.cc/K5Y3-HXQE].
3 See, e.g., LL Cool J, Mama Said Knock You Out (Def Jam 1990) (“I’m rocking my peers
/ Puttin’ suckers in fear / Makin’ the tears rain down like a monsoon / Listen to the bass go
boom.”).

124

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2020]

Blackness as Fighting Words

125

we would often form a circle around the contenders, laughing as they
hurled jokes back and forth about athletic ability or sneaker selection or
skin color into the cypher. “You so stupid you tried to save a fish from
drowning.” “You so ugly even Hello Kitty said goodbye.” “You so black
you gotta wear white gloves to eat chocolate.” But inevitably, as soon as
someone uttered that dreaded phrase—“Yo mama”—the playful
exchange always took a turn for the worse. We all knew there was no
turning back at that point. In the South Bronx, those were fighting words.
As a Black youth roaming New York City’s urban metropolis in the
1990s, mastering the nuances of fighting words was critical to
maintaining close friendships and keeping potential enemies at bay.
However, in the age of Donald Trump, fighting words have taken on new
meaning. In response to sharp critiques of his political agenda—from
assertions that his tax reforms benefit the wealthy, to contentions that his
Muslim bans have incited political Islamophobia, to revelations that his
trade manipulations influence immigration policy4—Trump’s brazen
rhetorical style has transformed the bully pulpit into a stage for bullying. 5
Whereas the fighting words of my youth reflected bruised egos and
shallow differences of opinion, the fighting words of Donald Trump have
normalized “racist, sexist, homophobic, and xenophobic rhetoric” from
the leader of the United States that too often has fanned the flames of
racial violence. 6 With the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic,

4 See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslims Bans” and the (Re)making of Political
Islamophobia, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1733, 1768 (defining political Islamophobia as “a strategy
to garner votes, particularly among disaffected segments of the electorate who take to bigoted
and xenophobic messaging”); see also Jeff Ernsthausen & Justin Elliott, Billionaires Keep
Benefiting from a Tax Break To Help the Poor. Now, Congress Wants To Investigate.,
ProPublica (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/billionaires-keepbenefiting-from-a-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-now-congress-wants-to-investigate
[https://perma.cc/33BD-AE76] (describing criticism of the Trump administration’s handling
of tax “opportunity zones”); Felicia Sonmez & David J. Lynch, Trump’s Erratic Policy Moves
Put National Security at Risk, Experts Warn, Wash. Post (June 23, 2019, 8:15 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-erratic-policy-moves-put-national-security-at-risk-experts-warn/2019/06/23/9cfae958-95d2-11e9-830a-21b9b36b64ad_story.html
[https://perma.cc/KCR3-9ZMX] (noting the Trump administration’s manipulation of trade
negotiations to influence immigration policy).
5 See Heather Digby Parton, Trump Has Used the “Bully Pulpit” More than Any President
in History—and That’s Terrifying, Salon (Apr. 8, 2020, 1:35 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2020/04/08/trump-has-used-the-bully-pulpit-more-than-anypresident-in-history--and-thats-terrifying/ [https://perma.cc/F47B-PVQ6]; Atiba R. Ellis,
Normalizing Domination, 20 CUNY L. Rev. 493, 493 (2017).
6 Ellis, supra note 5, at 493.
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coupled with a new onslaught of citizen murders at the hands of police
officers, Donald Trump’s presidency—one marred by impeachment
proceedings on charges of abuse of power and obstruction of Congress7—
has devolved into social unrest, nationwide uprisings, and the unraveling
of law and order.8
The resurgence of worldwide protests by racial justice activists has
ushered in a global reckoning with the meaning of this generation’s
rallying cry—“Black Lives Matter.”9 As cities emblazon their streets with
this expression in massive artistic murals,10 the Trump administration has
responded with the militarized policing of non-violent public
demonstrations, revealing not merely a disregard for public safety, but far
worse, a concerted dismantling of protestors’ First Amendment rights. 11
Yet despite a surging pandemic, Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) protests
have persisted.12 Accordingly, this Essay considers the implications of

7 See Lili Loofbourow, Impeachment Is a Permanent Stain on Trump’s Presidency, Slate
(Dec. 18, 2019, 8:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/12/impeachment-impacttrump-presidency-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/2XHX-9X7Z]; Nicholas Fandos & Michael
D. Shear, Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html
[https://perma.cc/2RZN-TX2W].
8 See Stephen Collinson, While Trump Shelters in the White House, America Cries out for
Leadership, CNN (June 1, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/politics/trumpwhite-house-racial-unrest-leadership/index.html [https://perma.cc/3HKU-PMDN].
9 See generally Christopher J. LeBron, The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History
of an Idea (2017) (positioning Black Lives Matter within the historical Black intellectual
tradition); Jen Kirby, “Black Lives Matter” Has Become a Global Rallying Cry Against
Racism
and
Police
Brutality,
Vox
(June
12,
2020,
7:30
AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/12/21285244/black-lives-matter-global-protests-george-floyduk-belgium.
10 See Leah Asmelash, Washington’s New Black Lives Matter Street Mural Is Captured in
Satellite Image, CNN (June 6, 2020, 4:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/us/blacklives-matter-dc-street-mural-space-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/68B7-6AK5]; Wyatte
Grantham-Philips, Powerful Photos Show ‘Black Lives Matter’ Painted Across Streets
Nationwide, USA Today (June 19, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/-nation/2020/06/17/black-lives-matter-painted-city-streets-see-art-nyc-washington/3204742001/
[https://perma.cc/V6MQ-KKP5].
11 See Garrett Epps, Trump’s Grotesque Violation of the First Amendment, Atlantic (June
2, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/trumps-grotesque-violationfirst-amendment/612532/ [https://perma.cc/T776-XVE6]; Katie Bo Williams, Trump, GOP
Allies Reach for Military Response to Domestic Protests, Defense One (June 1, 2020, 11:21
PM),
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/trump-and-allies-reach-militaryresponse-domestic-protests/165819/ [https://perma.cc/H9KZ-45ZB].
12 See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/-
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this generation’s acclamation of Black humanity amidst the social
tensions exposed during the age of COVID-19. What does the Trump
administration’s militarized response to BLM protests mean in a world
mutilated by the scars of racial oppression, a wound laid bare by
America’s racially biased, aggressive, and supervisory culture of
policing?
In response, this Essay suggests and defends a singular contention:
Black identity itself, or “Blackness”13—whether articulated by the pure
speech of racial justice activists who affirm Black humanity, or embodied
by the symbolic speech of Black bodies assembled in collective dissent in
the public square—has become “‘fighting’ words” in the consciousness
of America, a type of public speech unprotected by the Constitution.14
interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[https://perma.cc/LE73BV5Q].
13 Articulating a robust definition of “Blackness” is beyond the scope of this Essay, but a
few points are noteworthy. First, this dialogue does not presume an a priori concept of
Blackness, that is, one divorced from the discourses and embedded interests that seek to name
it. Second, there is a subtle distinction between “Black” and “Blackness”—while Black is a
racial identity that generally “implies the presence of a significant amount of melanin in one’s
skin,” the term Blackness implies something else, “a shared set of historical, social, and
cultural mores[,] . . . a sociocultural marker indicating that one acts in culturally specific
ways.” Rone Shavers, Fear of a Performative Planet: Troubling the Concept of “PostBlackness”, in The Trouble with Post-Blackness 81, 82 (Houston A. Baker Jr. & K. Merinda
Simmons eds., Colum. Univ. Press 2015). As a result, Blackness is a contested concept. Many
performative markers of Blackness do not originate from Black culture, but they instead are
imposed upon it, imbuing the concept of Blackness with both a masking and revelatory nature.
See id. at 84. Third, notwithstanding the contested nature of Blackness as a sociocultural
concept that defines both ethnic and racial identity, this Essay embraces the notion of
Blackness evoked by Paul Gilroy as a “‘changing’ same.” Paul Gilroy, Sounds Authentic:
Black Music, Ethnicity, and the Challenge of a Changing Same, 11 Black Music Rsch. J. 111,
111 (1991). While the performative aspects of Blackness are always evolving, Blackness
continues to reflect the unwavering tradition of freedom struggle in response to the enduring
mythologies of white supremacy. See id. at 113, 122–23, 134–35 (arguing against essentialism
in Black cultural analysis, but concluding that concepts of Blackness, particularly as expressed
in music, can authentically change over time and diversify, even if rooted in similar stories
and the same history).
14 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (“‘[F]ighting’
words . . . [are] those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”);
see also Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (holding similarly that “breach[es] of
the peace” are not protected by the First Amendment because “[w]hen clear and present danger
of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to
public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious”
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))).
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The very utterance of the phrase “Black Lives Matter” tends to incite
imminent violence and unbridled rage from police in city streets across
America. Discussions of “Black Lives Matter” by pundits tend to conjure
images of subversion, disorder, and looting, the racialized narratives of
social unrest commonly portrayed by the media.15 Yet the words “Black
Lives Matter” and the peaceful assembly of Black protestors also
encapsulate the righteous indignation burning in the hearts of minoritized
citizens. Discussions of “Black Lives Matter” by activists and scholars
evoke what Cornel West calls the “prophetic pragmatism” of the Black
radical tradition, a historic commitment to the democratic ideals of
equality and liberty amidst entrenched systems of racial subordination.16
This dynamic reflects unresolved tensions in the First Amendment’s
treatment of racial relations in America, a wrenching of the spirit that
Critical Race Theorists Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic argue “lies at
the heart of two of our deepest values—civil rights and equal respect, on
the one hand, and freedom of speech on the other.”17 While the First
Amendment is often heralded as an exemplar of American legal
exceptionalism,18 in practice it has become, as Justin Hansford declares,
“a racial project.”19 Similar to Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property,

15 See Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, ‘Carnage,’ ‘Radicals,’ ‘Overthrow the Government’: How
Fox and Other Conservative Media Cover the Protests, Wash. Post (June 2, 2020, 1:59 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/heres-how-fox-news-and-other-conservative-media-are-covering-the-protests-and-violence-following-the-george-floyd-killing/2020/06/02/c0dd4458-a4de-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/R7JSHS4Y].
16 See Cornel West, Keeping Faith: Philosophy and Race in America 139 (1993) (describing
prophetic pragmatism as a creative appropriation of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism
from the perspective of the oppressed, and as a practice that “analyzes the social causes of
unnecessary forms of social misery, promotes moral outrage against them, organizes different
constituencies to alleviate them, yet does so with an openness to its own blindnesses and
shortcomings”).
17 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound 2, 6 (2004); see
also Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 Duke L.J. 431, 434 (discussing the nuances of protecting racist speech under the First
Amendment); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s
Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2320, 2322 (1989) (discussing the victims of hate speech
protected under the First Amendment); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action
for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 134 (1982)
(arguing for a new tort for victims of racial insults).
18 See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in American Exceptionalism
and Human Rights 31 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
19 Justin Hansford, The First Amendment Freedom of Assembly as a Racial Project, 127
Yale L.J.F. 685, 690 (2018); see also Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
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which unmasked the way race neutrality in law and public policy
rationalizes the “property” rights of white privilege, 20 this Essay exposes
how seemingly neutral constitutional constructs rationalize “the ‘iron fist’
of the penal state” in response to both traditional violent crime and
peaceful public protest, smothering the constitutional rights of Black and
Brown citizens by legitimating “the extra-penological functions of penal
institutions.”21 As Devon Carbado explains, police officers routinely use
violence in Black and Brown communities not to quell social disruption
but rather to reinforce social control.22 Such discretionary measures, as
Dorothy Roberts clarifies, pave the way for police abuse of ordermaintenance policies that, similar to vague loitering laws that the
Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional, “give police a wide net to trap
citizens who look dangerous” and “also allow police to discriminate
against citizens based on personal prejudices.”23 Building upon such
scholarship, this Essay provides three contributions to the ongoing
discourse on policing in America.
First, it reveals how racial tensions in the First Amendment—focusing
specifically on ambiguities in the fighting-words doctrine—perpetuate
Preferences: Rethinking Racial Projects, in Racial Formation in the Twenty-First Century 183,
183 (Daniel Martinez HoSang, Oneka LaBennett & Laura Pulido eds., 2012).
20 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1707, 1709 (1993); see also
id. at 1715 (arguing that “Whiteness as property has taken on more subtle forms, but retains
its core characteristic—the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that
enshrine the status quo as a neutral baseline, while masking the maintenance of white privilege
and domination”).
21 Loïc Wacquant, The Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age,
openDemocracy (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/punitiveregulation-of-poverty-in-neoliberal-age/ [https://perma.cc/AH9C-7RZC]; see also id. (noting
“that, in the wake of the race riots of the 1960s, the police, courts and prison have been
deployed to contain the urban dislocations wrought by economic deregulation and the
implosion of the ghetto as an ethno-racial container, and to impose the discipline of insecure
employment at the bottom of the polarizing class structure”).
22 See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the
Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1482–83, 1515 (2016) (“Approaches to policing that are designed
to signal to lay people that police officers are in charge of or ‘own’ the community they police
encourage police officers to employ policing as a source of governance strategy to socially
control communities.”); Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 563
(2017) (noting that “[t]he relationship among social control policing, mass criminalization,
and arrest likely shaped policing dynamics in Ferguson”); cf. L. Song Richardson, Police Use
of Force, in 2 Reforming Criminal Justice 185, 194–95 (2017) (describing how police’s “racial
anxiety may cause officers to enact command presence when it is unnecessary,” which can
lead to violence).
23 Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of OrderMaintenance Policing, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775, 777, 789–90 (1999).
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the racially biased, aggressive, and supervisory culture of American
policing,24 an approach to law enforcement that Paul Gowder calls the
“command model” due to its arbitrary usage of commands to organize
and control social space.25 Such tensions are laid bare when peaceful
assemblies of BLM protestors who petition the government for redress of
racial grievances are deemed disturbances of the peace by police officers
and met by violent police force, actions that implicate the fighting-words
doctrine and call into question the contours of unprotected speech.
Importantly, such discretionary authority reveals the misplaced focus of
the fighting-words doctrine on the inability of the recipient of fighting
words to restrain themselves from violence and not on the actual
substance of the words spoken. This framing renders the police officer as
judge, jury, and executioner when it comes to interpreting the meaning of
Black protest speech.26
Second, this Essay analyzes how such racial tensions in the First
Amendment—as conveyed by a racially biased and aggressive police
culture—cast a dark shadow over the liberty of Black and Brown citizens
who experience racism at the hands of police yet avoid acts of protest for
fear of bodily harm or arrest, resulting in a chilling effect on free speech. 27
To be sure, the fighting-words doctrine has garnered limited attention in
legal scholarship,28 and it might even be deemed inconsequential, as
courts have narrowed its applicability to verbal disputes between citizens
24

See, e.g., Vesla Weaver, Gwen Prowse & Spencer Piston, Withdrawing and Drawing in:
Political Discourse in Policed Communities, J. Race Ethnicity & Pol. 1, 3 (2020) (examining
“how black participants in poor and working-class neighborhoods co-construct meaning
around state authority in conversation with one another, given their unique experience with
state violence, surveillance, and discipline, and police as enforcers of racial order”).
25 See Paul Gowder, A Rule of Law Case for Police Abolition 8 (July 24, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
26 See, e.g., Stamm v. Miller, 14-cv-11951, 2015 WL 13047103, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr.
27, 2015) (noting, in a wrongful death case for unlawful use of deadly force, the defendant
officer’s psychological evaluations in which he “described the role of the police as ‘judge,
jury, and executioner’”), aff’d, 657 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2016).
27 See, e.g., Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Police Violence
and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 Am. Socio. Rev. 857, 858 (2016)
(revealing how high-profile cases of police violence and misconduct against unarmed citizens,
especially in low-income Black neighborhoods, can undermine the legitimacy of legal
authority and suppress police-related 911 calls).
28 See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 531, 535 (1980);
see also Mark Pearlstein, Constitutional Law—The “Fighting Words Doctrine” Is Applied to
Abusive Language Toward Policemen, 22 DePaul L. Rev. 725 (1973); Burton Caine, The
Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a Threat to First
Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 441 (2004).
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and police officers.29 Indeed, modern courts rarely enforce convictions
based upon the usage of “fighting words” to disturb the peace. 30
Notwithstanding, this Essay accomplishes important philosophical work,
framing foundational constitutional constructs in the context of Black
lived experience, which raises disconcerting questions about the
American democratic project. Does the existence of a legal regime that
threatens to criminalize anti-racist public speech if it harms its target and
incites an immediate breach of the peace (even if such arrests are routinely
unenforced by courts) constitute a culture of suppression that silences
dissent with fear of police retaliation? A rule of law driven by fear of the
police not only distorts the ideal of liberty that underscores liberal
democracy, but it also is eerily reminiscent of the culture of slave patrols
that threatened the lives of defiant Black Americans in Antebellum
America. 31
Third, by highlighting racial tensions in the fighting-words doctrine,
this Essay illuminates the embeddedness of racism in American policing
culture more generally. This culture not only constructs and reconstitutes
the social order by perpetuating stereotypes of minoritized communities
as sites of disorder that require constant supervision, but it also degrades
the dignity of Black and Brown Americans by treating them as secondclass citizens unworthy of private autonomy, while hindering the broader
policing goal of minimizing crime.32 Perhaps this explains why some
people choose to run at the very sight of police officers. Collectively,
these insights lend support toward recent demands for police abolition
from activists and legal scholars,33 which build upon a rich tradition of
29

See infra note 106.
See infra note 106.
31 See infra Part II.
32 See, e.g., Rod K. Brunson, Protests Focus on Over-Policing. But Under-Policing Is Also
Deadly,
Wash.
Post
(June
12,
2020,
9:10
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/underpolicing-cities-violentcrime/2020/06/12/b5d1fd26-ac0c-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html
[https://perma.cc/EL36-JP4J] (“The result is that many black and brown communities now
suffer from the worst of all worlds: over-aggressive police behavior in frequent encounters
with residents, coupled with the inability of law enforcement to effectively protect public
safety.”).
33 See, e.g., Derecka Purnell, How I Became a Police Abolitionist, Atlantic (July 6, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/how-i-became-police-abolitionist/613540/ [https://perma.cc/S6AB-6QK2]; Zak Cheney-Rice, Why Police Abolition Is a
Useful
Framework—Even
for
Skeptics,
N,Y.
Mag. (June
15,
2020),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/06/police-abolitionist-lessons-for-america.html;
V.
Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence
30
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abolition scholarship from Angela Davis, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Mariame
Kaba, and others.34
Part I of this Essay offers a retrospective on the Author’s personal
discovery of the nature of Blackness as fighting words through the story
of Amadou Diallo in the Bronx, New York. Then, Part II discusses how
America’s legacy of white supremacy has infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of Black and Brown citizens, including during the
presidential administration of Donald Trump. Next, Part III explores the
origins of the fighting-words doctrine and highlights its inconsistent
treatment among courts, which has inspired ambiguity regarding its
present-day meaning. Part IV then reveals how such inconsistencies and
ambiguities raise important questions about the limits of constitutional
protection for Black and Brown citizens who encounter racism at the
hands of police while engaging in acts of protest. Finally, Part V suggests
that the ambiguities surrounding the Constitution’s protection (or lack
thereof) of anti-racist speech that incites violence and disturbs the peace
explains why some police officers believe they are authorized to use force
in response to non-violent BLM protests.
Taken together, this Essay contends that until we as a nation wrestle
with the racial subtext of modern policing—a culture woven into law that
not only silences the legitimate public protests of minoritized citizens in
violation of their First Amendment rights but also rationalizes callous
violence at the hands of law enforcement—Black America will remain at
peril to the veil of white supremacy that looms over the American
constitutional order. Importantly, this is not a call to transgress race or
usher in an era of post-Blackness. In other scholarship, I note the
importance of embracing the cultural specificity of Blackness to dislodge
the perceived neutrality of Whiteness.35 Nor is this an attempt to
Through Abolition Democracy, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1453, 1458–59 (2019); Alex S. Vitale,
The End of Policing 228 (2017).
34 See, e.g., Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 9–10 (2003); Eduardo Mendieta,
Introduction, in Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, Prisons, and Torture 7, 16 (2005);
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing
California 242 (2007); Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might
Change
Your
Mind,
N.Y.
Times
Mag.
(Apr.
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-wilson-gilmore.html
[https://perma.cc/6NVJ-A6PA]; Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police,
N.Y. Times (June 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floydabolish-defund-police.html [https://perma.cc/R6AQ-RL8Z].
35 See Etienne C. Toussaint, Dismantling the Master’s House: Toward a Justice-Based
Theory of Community Economic Development, 53 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 337, 407–08 (2019)
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essentialize Black identity or Black performativity as something to be
pitied. As Imani Perry eloquently retorted, “I must turn the pitying gaze
back upon any who offer it to me, because they cannot understand the
spiritual majesty of joy in suffering.”36 Rather, and simply, this Essay
bears witness to the absurdity and perversity of state-sponsored violence
at any and all affirmations of Black humanity, and beckons America to a
moral reckoning.
I. LIVING IN YOUR AMERICAN SKIN
I was thirteen years old when I first learned that sometimes “fighting
words” don’t require any words at all. I didn’t realize when I got off the
public bus on my way home from school that the crowd of people
gathered in the street near the barbershop were protestors. I didn’t know
on that February afternoon why my neighbors were so angry, jumping up
and down like a Sunday morning choir, each person echoing the words of
a heavyset Black preacher who barked lyrics into a megaphone on an
elevated platform, his permed hair waving in the wind. 37 I didn’t know
why the mother at the front of the pack was howling, nor why the
neighborhood kids hovered nearby on Huffy bikes like anxious pups
learning how to hunt. I didn’t know what was happening until later that
night because it was the year 1999; our modern culture of camera phones
and citizen recordings of police interactions had not yet been invented.
The nightly news would have to suffice.
After sneaking another Little Debbie Fudge Round from the kitchen
cabinet, I learned on the Channel 4 News that the crowd of people
gathered three blocks from my home were angry about an incident
involving a twenty-three-year-old Black man named Amadou Diallo.38 I
(“Viewing CED through a justice-based lens urges us to embrace a collective democratic
responsibility to resolve our country’s legacy of institutional racism and economic segregation
through law reform.”).
36 Imani Perry, Racism Is Terrible. Blackness Is Not., Atlantic (June 15, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/racism-terrible-blackness-not/613039/
[https://perma.cc/G63D-TDMU].
37 See Kit R. Roane, Sharpton Among 28 Arrested in Rally on Diallo Killing, N.Y. Times
(Mar. 4, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/04/nyregion/sharpton-among-28-arrestedin-rally-on-diallo-killing.html [https://perma.cc/WX34-HZ9B]; Ese Olumhense, 20 Years
After the NYPD Killing of Amadou Diallo, His Mother and Community Ask: What’s
Changed?, N.Y. Mag. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/after-thenypd-killing-of-amadou-diallo-whats-changed.html.
38 Trial by Media: 41 Shots (Netflix 2020); Christian Red, Years Before Black Lives Matter,
41
Shots
Killed
Him,
N.Y.
Times
(July
19,
2019),
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learned that four New York City plainclothes police officers had fired
forty-one copper-jacketed bullets from 9mm Glock semi-automatic guns
at Amadou in front of his apartment house doorway, not too far from the
corner store bodega where I often purchased Sour Power Strawberry
Straws.39 I learned that the police officers claimed to have mistaken
Amadou for a serial rape suspect from one year prior.40 I learned that
Amadou was possibly reaching for his wallet, perhaps to show his ID,
when the police officers started shooting.41 I learned that Amadou was
shot before he even told the officers his name,42 before he had the chance
to defend his honor as a man with a mother and father who cared.43 I
learned that Amadou was simply a West African immigrant street peddler
of bootlegged tapes and cheap tube socks, perhaps hoping to avoid
another run-in with the law.44 I learned that when the officers searched
Amadou’s perforated body for a gun, they found only a black wallet and
a shattered beeper covered with blood.45 I learned that at least one of the
officers wept.46 I learned facts that many Americans would not, not due
to their apathy, but instead to sheer ignorance. After all, although
Amadou’s murder sparked local unrest, it took place well before the

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/nyregion/amadou-diallo-mother-eric-garner.html
[https://perma.cc/HKD8-2JG4].
39 Red, supra note 38; Tom Hays, NY Officers Acquitted in Diallo Case, Wash. Post (Feb.
25, 2000, 5:45 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/aponline/20000225/aponline174509_000.htm [https://perma.cc/N2XZ-NCQC]; Michael Grunwald, Immigrant Killed by
Police Mourned, Wash. Post (Feb. 13, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/national/daily/feb99/bronx13.htm [https://perma.cc/9U7L-X3EM]; Heather Mac Donald,
Diallo Truth, Diallo Falsehood, City J. (Summer 1999), https://www.cityjournal.org/html/diallo-truth-diallo-falsehood-12011.html [https://perma.cc/K7XL-VDP4].
40 See Police Fired 41 Shots when They Killed Amadou Diallo. His Mom Hopes Today’s
Protests Will Bring Change, CBS News (June 9, 2020, 11:11 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amadou-diallo-kadiatou-protests-george-floyd-police/
[https://perma.cc/5GC8-VV52].
41 Grunwald, supra note 39.
42 Mac Donald, supra note 39.
43 In April 2000, Amadou Diallo’s mother and father filed a $61 million wrongful death
lawsuit against the officers and the city. See Diallo’s Parents File $61 Million Lawsuit Against
New
York
Police
and
City,
CNN
(Apr.
18,
2000),
https://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/18/diallo.lawsuit/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7J7HKNQ8]. In 2004, Kadiatou Diallo, Amadou’s mother, published a memoir about her life and
the loss of her son. See Kadiatou Diallo & Craig Wolff, My Heart Will Cross This Ocean: My
Story, My Son, Amadou (2004).
44 Mac Donald, supra note 39.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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advent of Twitter and YouTube and Facebook, tools that might have
propelled his name into the national consciousness.
That night, lying in bed below our popcorn ceiling as the sound of the
Six Train thumped in the distance, I realized two truths and one lie about
my South Bronx. Truth number one: in some neighborhoods, being Black
could get you killed for living in your American skin. 47 Truth number
two: in some neighborhoods, Black people and police officers exist in an
inescapable Hobbesian state of nature, a world seemingly ruled by
lawlessness, mistrust, and unchecked violence. 48 Here’s the lie: my
neighborhood was not one of those neighborhoods.
I wanted to believe my lie, but my precocious mind had already
deduced the logical truth about my world’s state of nature. I concluded
that the police would be waiting outside to greet me on my way to school
with a nod and bid me farewell on my return home with a wave. I
concluded that in my hood, between the corner store bodega and the
barbershop, Black men and police officers exist in a never-ending cypher
where taunts and gibes are traded back and forth on the asphalt until
someone takes it too far. I concluded that, in my South Bronx, fighting
words don’t require a joke about someone’s mother or, quite frankly, any
words at all; being Black is more than enough.
II. THUGS AND VERY GOOD PEOPLE
In 1989, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Brennan declared in
Texas v. Johnson that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or

47 Others realized too. Bruce Springsteen wrote a song reflecting on the story of Amadou
Diallo that later sparked controversy. See Bruce Springsteen, American Skin (41 Shots), on
Live in New York City (Columbia Records 2001); Julian E. Barnes, Springsteen Song About
Diallo
Prompts
Anger
from
Police,
N.Y.
Times
(June
13,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/06/13/nyregion/springsteen-song-about-diallo-promptsanger-from-police.html [https://perma.cc/M2TR-MUH8]. Other artists similarly reflected
upon the tragedy of Diallo’s murder. See, e.g., Wyclef Jean, Diallo, on The Ecleftic: 2 Sides
II a Book (Columbia Records 2000) (“Have you ever been shot forty-one times? Have you
ever screamed, and no one heard you cry? . . . Who’ll be the next to fire forty-one shots by
Diallo’s side?”); Trivium, Contempt Breeds Contamination, on The Crusade (Roadrunner
2006) (“The four protectors fired forty-one shots / Hitting him nineteen times / Searching the
body, there were no weapons found / He lies with all who died in vain.”).
48 See Raff Donelson, Blacks, Cops, and the State of Nature, 15 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 183,
183–84 (2017).
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disagreeable.”49 This ethic has guided a longstanding protection afforded
to citizens who engage in public acts of protest. In response to AntiFederalists who sought specific guarantees of a bill of rights against the
far reaches of national governmental power, 50 James Madison drafted the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth century
as a declaration of the people’s freedom of speech, freedom to peaceably
assemble, and freedom to petition the government.51 As a result, since
1791, white citizens of America have been empowered to peacefully
march and demonstrate on public lands to petition the government for
redress of grievances.
However, the Constitution and its Bill of Rights have maintained a
complex relationship with Black America, beginning with the Africans
who were enslaved as the chattel of many of the Constitution’s writers,
and continuing with their descendants (including the Black descendants
of the Constitution’s writers)52 who frequently live as nominally free but
substantively second-class citizens.53 Indeed, the Constitution’s
declaration of free speech for “We the People” was not drafted with Black
Americans in mind; they were deemed merely three-fifths of a human
during its passage.54 As a result, prior to the Civil War, enslaved Africans
49

491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
See generally Donald L. Horowtiz, The Federalist Abroad in the World, in The Federalist
Papers 502, 509 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009); see also The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton),
in The Federalist Papers, supra, at 431 (describing the objection that the Constitution did not
have a bill of rights).
51 See Noah Feldman, James Madison’s Lessons in Racism, N.Y. Times (Oct. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/opinion/sunday/james-madison-racism.html
[https://perma.cc/THD6-2W44]; U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
52 See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family 24–
26 (2008).
53 See generally Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in
North America 12–13, 360–61 (1998) (tracing the history of slavery in the United States and
showing that even freed slaves continued to be subject to pervasive subjugation); Nathan Irvin
Huggins, Black Odyssey: The Afro-American Ordeal in Slavery, at xii–xiii (1977)
(documenting slavery in America and focusing on the lived experiences of enslaved Africans);
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 1–
2 (2012) (explaining how mass incarceration in modern America perpetuates the legacy of Jim
Crow); Michael Kent Curtis, Reflections on Albion Tourgée’s 1896 View of the Supreme
Court: A “Consistent Enemy of Personal Liberty and Equal Right”?, 5 Elon L. Rev. 19, 34
(2013) (discussing the Black Codes passed by Southern states during Reconstruction).
54 U.S. Const. pmbl.; see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (establishing that slaves only counted as threefifths of a citizen for purposes of determining congressional representation). See generally
50
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were prohibited from assembling for education,55 for leisure,56 for
worship,57 or for collective expressions of dissent.58 Slave patrols,
precursors to modern American policing that comprised “white men
deputized to prevent rebellions by stopping any enslaved people who
happened to be on the roads, searching them, and preventing them from
congregating,” enforced these Slave Codes. 59 When uprisings of the
enslaved occurred, driven by a collective moral dissent to the brutal
institution of slavery itself, Black men and Black women were met with
lashings, lynchings, and ultimately legal holdings that sought to
perpetuate and justify the debasement of Black lives.60
Yet even after slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment,
Black Codes were enacted across the United States to restrict the freedom

David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification 4–5 (2009)
(noting explicitly that the three-fifths clause applies to slaves); Feldman, supra note 51.
55 See, e.g., An Act Respecting Slaves, Free Negroes, Mulattoes, and Mestizoes, for
Inforcing the More Punctual Performance of Patrol Duty, and To Impose Certain Restrictions
on the Emancipation of Slaves, 1800 S.C. Acts 36–38 (codifying “[t]hat . . . all assemblies and
congregations of slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, and mestizoes, whether composed of all, or
any of the above description of persons, or of all or any of the above described persons, and
of a proportion of white persons, assembled or met together for the purpose of mental
instruction, in a confined or secret place of meeting . . . is hereby declared to be an unlawful
meeting . . . and the officers and persons so dispersing such unlawful assemblage of persons,
shall, if they think proper, impose such corporal punishment, not exceeding twenty lashes,
upon such slaves, free negroes, mulattoes, or mestizoes, as they may judge necessary for
detering them from the like unlawful assemblages in future” (emphasis added)).
56 See, e.g., An Act Further Declaring What Shall Be Deemed Unlawful Meetings of Slaves
[Passed January 24, 1804], ch. 119, § 1, 1804 Va. Acts 89 (“[T]hat all meetings or assemblages
of slaves, at any meeting house or houses, or any other place or places, in the night . . . shall
be deemed and considered as an unlawful assembly, and any justice of the county . . . may
issue his warrant . . . to inflict corporal punishment on the offender or offenders . . . not
exceeding twenty lashes.”).
57 See, e.g., An Act Concerning Free Persons of Colour, Their Guardians, and Coloured
Preachers, § 5, 1833 Ga. Laws 226–28 (“That no person of colour, whether free or slave, shall
be allowed to preach to, exhort or join in any religious exercise, with any persons of colour,
either free or slave, there being more than seven persons of colour present. . . . Any free person
of colour offending against this provision, to be liable on conviction . . . to imprisonment at
the discretion of the court . . . . [I]f this is insufficient, he shall be sentenced to be whipped and
imprisoned at the discretion of the court . . . .”).
58 See, e.g., An Act To Punish the Crimes Therein Mentioned, and for Other Purposes, § 1,
1830 La. Acts 96 (“That whosoever shall write, print, publish or distribute, any thing having
a tendency to produce discontent among the free coloured population of the state, or
insubordination among the slaves therein, shall . . . be sentenced to imprisonment at hard
labour for life or suffer death, at the discretion of the court.”).
59 See Hansford, supra note 19, at 692.
60 See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406–07 (1857).
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of Black citizens, from restrictions on their right to assemble for leisure61
to restrictions on their right to assemble for protest. 62 Although Black
Americans were granted access to the Constitution’s Bill of Rights during
the Reconstruction era, the rise of racial terrorists in the form of the Ku
Klux Klan, coupled with the refusal of law enforcement to protect Black
lives from the Klan’s vicious acts of racial violence, stifled the First
Amendment rights of an oppressed people.63 Not only have Critical Race
Theorists critiqued the failure of courts to regulate “the racist message of
segregation” and other forms of hate speech, but they have also revealed
the subordination of Black dignity interests by courts to the freedom of
speech interests of white supremacists.64 Accordingly, America’s modern
system of law enforcement, as Brandon Hasbrouck explains, emerges as
a “badge[] and incident[]” of slavery, calling into question the
constitutionality of contemporary policing culture under the Thirteenth
Amendment.65 From racial profiling to stop and frisk, pretextual stops,
and the usage of excessive force—what Paul Butler has called police
superpowers66—American policing perpetuates a system of racial
oppression that overwhelms Black and Brown lives.67

61 See, e.g., An Act To Amend the Vagrant Laws of the State, § 2, 1865 Miss. Laws 90–91
(“[A]ll freedmen, free negroes and mulattoes in this State, over the age of eighteen years,
found on the second Monday in January, 1866, or thereafter, with no lawful employment or
business, or found unlawfully assembling themselves together either in the day or night
time . . . shall be deemed vagrants, and on conviction thereof, shall be fined in the sum of not
exceeding, in the case of a freedman, free negro or mulatto, fifty dollars . . . and imprisoned
at the discretion of the court . . . .”).
62 See, e.g., Black Code of St. Landry’s Parish, Louisiana, 1865, in The Columbia
Documentary History of Race and Ethnicity in America 295, 295–96 (Ronald H. Bayor ed.,
2004) (“Be it further ordained, That no negro shall be permitted to preach, exhort, or otherwise
declaim to congregations of colored people, without a special permission in writing from the
president of the police jury. Any negro violating the provisions of this section shall pay a fine
of ten dollars, or in default thereof shall be forced to work ten days on the public road, or
suffer corporeal punishment as hereinafter provided.”).
63 See generally James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank
(1876) Belongs at the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 385, 394–405 (2014) (describing the Ku Klux Klan’s rise during Reconstruction,
including its unchecked violence against Black Americans).
64 Lawrence, supra note 17, at 462–66; see Hansford, supra note 19, at 693–94.
65 Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with the Thirteenth Amendment, 68
UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 200, 217 (2020).
66 See generally Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men 1–9 (2017) (documenting the
extreme disparities in policing as applied to Black Americans).
67 Hasbrouck, supra note 65, at 212–13.
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In the age of Trump, little has changed as the constitutional rights of
Black and Brown protestors have increasingly come under attack.
Following the murders of several Black citizens—jogger Ahmaud Arbery
in broad daylight after being hunted down by white vigilantes; 68 George
Floyd under the knee of a callous white police officer on suspicion of
forgery;69 Breonna Taylor in her apartment (in the dead of the night)
during a mistaken drug raid;70 and countless others71—frustrated and
angry Americans have taken to the streets in cities across the country,
from New York to Chicago to Los Angeles.72 Reminiscent of the
uprisings that erupted after the killings of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and
Michael Brown in 2014, tragedies that birthed the Black Lives Matter
movement, such protesters—Black and non-Black alike—have been met
by aggressive and violent policing tactics for affirming Black humanity,
from tear gas to rubber bullets to vicious beatings.73 In contrast, and to
underscore the singularity of Blackness as fighting words in the eyes of

68 See Dakin Andone, Angela Barajas & Jason Morris, A Suspect in the Killing of Ahmaud
Arbery Was Involved in a Previous Investigation of Him, Recused Prosecutor Says, CNN
(May 9, 2020, 7:18 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/08/us/ahmaud-arbery-mcmichaelarrests-friday/index.html [https://perma.cc/5T8N-NJ5N].
69 See Erin Donaghue, Four Minneapolis Police Officers Fired After Death of Unarmed Man
George Floyd, CBS News (May 28, 2020, 6:54 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fourminneapolis-police-officers-fired-george-floyd-death-video/ [https://perma.cc/JH5Z-FG8U].
70 See Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Who Was Breonna Taylor? What We Know About
the Louisville ER Tech Fatally Shot by Police, Courier J. (May 12, 2020, 6:25 AM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2020/05/12/breonna-taylor-case-whatknow-louisville-emt-killed-cops/3110066001/ [https://perma.cc/398F-KXW8].
71 See Mohammed Haddad, Mapping US Police Killings of Black Americans, Al Jazeera
(May 31, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2020/05/mapping-policekillings-black-americans-200531105741757.html [https://perma.cc/M6L7-US28] (“The
number of police killings in the US disproportionately affects African Americans. Despite
only making up 13 percent of the US population, Black Americans are two-and-a-half times
as likely as white Americans to be killed by the police.”).
72 See Richard Luscombe, Chris McGreal, Sam Levin, Julia Carrie Wong & David Smith,
George Floyd: Protests and Unrest Coast to Coast as US Cities Impose Curfews, Guardian
(May 31, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/may/30/george-floydprotests-saturday-curfews-minneapolis [https://perma.cc/EYR4-UKBF].
73 See generally Barbara Ransby, Making All Black Lives Matter: Reimagining Freedom in
the Twenty-First Century 5–6 (2018) (tracing the origins of the Black Lives Matter
movement); Jennifer E. Cobbina, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Why the Protests in Ferguson and
Baltimore Matter, and How They Changed America 2–3 (2019) (describing the uprisings in
Ferguson and Baltimore); Hansford, supra note 19, at 690 (“For example, antiracist protesters
from Selma to Ferguson to Mizzou have generally faced harsh sanctions through the use of
tear gas, tanks, physical threats, and economic threats.”).
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police officers, white protestors decrying racial justice activism are often
met with law enforcement support.74
To be sure, one could argue that Donald Trump’s presidency has
merely perpetuated the militarization of policing that followed the
uprising in Ferguson, Missouri, after the killing of Michael Brown,
perhaps part and parcel of Trump’s authoritarian yet fundamentally
neoliberal panache. 75 However, since Trump’s election, a surge of antiprotest legislation has been passed in various states that empower police
to arrest people for encouraging “violence” through traditionally
protected forms of speech.76 Although first introduced during the Obama
administration, before President Trump took office, these bills have
become increasingly commonplace since Trump’s inauguration. Further,
President Trump has endeavored to cement Black identity—whether
evoked by public speech or embodied by free assembly—as a kind of
unprotected free speech. Indeed, the violent police responses to Black
Lives Matter activists, whom President Trump referred to as “THUGS,”77
stand in sharp contrast to the relatively passive law enforcement response
to armed right-wing protestors during COVID-19’s anti-lockdown
74 See, e.g., Mara Hvistendahl & Alleen Brown, Armed Vigilantes Antagonizing Protesters
Have Received a Warm Reception from Police, Intercept (June 19, 2020, 1:55 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/06/19/militia-vigilantes-police-brutality-protests/
[https://perma.cc/J56B-XXBX]; Jack Brewster, Report: Trump Officials Were Directed To
Defend Kyle Rittenhouse Publicly, Documents Show, Forbes (Oct. 1, 2020, 10:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2020/10/01/report-trump-officials-were-directedto-defend-kyle-rittenhouse-publicly-documents-show/#2b19c84f6eeb [https://perma.cc/5DHB-JG45] (“Department of Homeland Security officials were told to express public comments
that would portray Kyle Rittenhouse—the 17-year-old charged with shooting three people,
two of them fatally, at a protest during a standoff between militia members and protesters in
Kenosha, Wisconsin—in a positive light . . . .”).
75 See Eliav Lieblich & Adam Shinar, Police Militarization in the Trump Era, Just Sec. (Feb.
1, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37125/police-militarization-trump-era/ [https://perma.cc/F3RA-KNBS]; Jonathan Chait, Trump Is Failing at Governing but Winning at
Authoritarianism, N.Y. Mag. (May 20, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/05/trump-authoritarian-democracy-barr-justice.html.
76 Olivia Rosane, 3 States Pass Anti-pipeline Protest Bills in Two Weeks, EcoWatch (Mar.
30,
2020,
8:58
AM),
https://www.ecowatch.com/anti-pipeline-protest-bills2645583954.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1 [https://perma.cc/TE52-EE9A]; Alleen Brown,
A Powerful Petrochemical Lobbying Group Advanced Anti-protest Legislation in the Midst
of the Pandemic, Intercept (June 7, 2020, 9:11 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/07/pipeline-petrochemical-lobbying-group-anti-protest-law/ [https://perma.cc/G3D5-UCUM].
77 Nick Visser, Trump Calls George Floyd Protesters ‘THUGS,’ Threatens Violent
Intervention in Minneapolis, Huffington Post (May 29, 2020, 3:03 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-minneapolis-thugs-george-floyd_n_5ed0a6cac5b6ebd583bed6be?guccounter=2 [https://perma.cc/2GHU-EJYB].
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demonstrations, whom President Trump called “very good people.”78
During the summer of 2020, the Trump administration introduced
policing tactics in response to peaceful BLM protests, including the
emergence of secret police employed by the Department of Homeland
Security who refuse to identify themselves, snatch protestors off the
street, detain protestors in unmarked vans without issuing formal charges,
and drive protestors to undisclosed locations to further undisclosed
ends.79 And most recently, during 2020’s first presidential debate,
President Trump ignored a request to publicly decry the Proud Boys, a
white supremacist right-wing militia group, stating instead, “Proud Boys?
Stand back and stand by.”80 Simply put, the Trump era transcends the
neoliberal politics of days past in ways that frighten ordinary sensibilities.
III. FREE SPEECH AND FIGHTING WORDS
Perhaps it is important to remember that the rights granted by the First
Amendment to the Constitution are not unconditional. Certainly, James
Madison argued against the narrow conception of free speech and
assembly that existed under English law.81 Under the British Riot Act of
Caleb Ecarma, Of Course Trump Called Armed, Right-Wing Protesters “Very Good
People”, Vanity Fair (May 1, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/05/donaldtrump-called-armed-right-wing-protesters-good-people [https://perma.cc/DFH2-5KWK]; see
Dartunorro Clark, Hundreds of Protesters, Some Carrying Guns in the State Capitol,
Demonstrate Against Michigan’s Emergency Measures, NBC News (Apr. 30, 2020, 3:30 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/hundreds-protest-michigan-lawmakersconsider-extending-governors-emergency-powers-n1196886
[https://perma.cc/23DPKA5Y]; see also T.C. Sottek, Caught on Camera, Police Explode in Rage and Violence Across
the US, Verge (May 31, 2020, 11:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/31/21276044/police-violence-protest-george-floyd.
79 See Igor Derysh, “They’re Kidnapping People”: “Trump’s Secret Police” Snatch Portland
Protesters into Unmarked Vans, Salon (July 17, 2020, 4:05 PM), https://www.salon.com/2020/07/17/theyre-kidnapping-people-trumps-secret-police-snatch-portland-protesters-intounmarked-vans/ [https://perma.cc/7BMB-VBWG]; David A. Graham, America Gets an
Interior Ministry, Atlantic (July 21, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/americas-interior-ministry/614389/
[https://perma.cc/3LST-VL5U];
Jonathan
Levinson & Conrad Wilson, Federal Law Enforcement Use Unmarked Vehicles To Grab
Protesters off Portland Streets, OPB (July 16, 2020, 5:45 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/federal-law-enforcement-unmarked-vehicles-portland-protesters/
[https://perma.cc/4NNS-F5RK].
80 Caleb Ecarma, Trump’s Proud Boys “Stand By” Debate Moment Is Snowballing, Vanity
Fair (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/09/donald-trump-proud-boysdebate-moment-snowballing [https://perma.cc/4YAS-TBGN].
81 See generally Wendell Bird, Press and Speech Under Assault: The Early Supreme Court
Justices, the Sedition Act of 1798, and the Campaign Against Dissent, at xxi (2016)
78
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1714, groups of twelve people or more could be forcefully dispersed, even
to the point of death, if deemed to be “unlawfully, riotously, and
tumultuously assembled together.”82 While elements of the British Riot
Act were incorporated into the Militia Acts enacted by the second United
States Congress in 1792 to enable the president to suppress insurrections
during a time of frequent social unrest,83 the Supreme Court affirmed free
speech principles in Edwards v. South Carolina (1963), declaring:
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. . . . There is no room under our
Constitution for a more restrictive view.84

Whereas the Federalist Party of President John Adams enacted the
Sedition Act in 1798 to ban speech directed at overthrowing the
government,85 the Supreme Court maintained in Brandenburg v. Ohio
(1969) that such speech is protected by the First Amendment, so long as
it is not “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” and
(describing the history of the limited conception of free speech under English common law);
Michael Kahn, The Origination and Early Development of Free Speech in the United States—
A Brief Overview, 76 Fla. Bar J. 71, 72–73 (2002) (mentioning James Madison’s expansive
initial draft of the First Amendment); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan.
18, 1800), in 6 The Writings of James Madison, 1790–1802, at 347, 384–87 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1906) (writing how the narrow British conception of free speech is incompatible with the
nascent American democracy).
82 The Riot Act 1714, 1 Geo. c.5, § 1.
83 The Riot Act of 1714, entitled An Act for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies,
and for the More Speedy and Effectual Punishing the Rioters, was passed by the Parliament
of Great Britain to respond to “many rebellious riots and tumults” and disturbances of the
peace that were deemed to “alienate the affections of the people from his Majesty.” Id.; see
also id. (“That if any persons to the number of twelve or more, being unlawfully, riotously,
and tumultuously assembled together, to the disturbance of the publick peace . . . and being
required or commanded by any one or more justice or justices of the peace . . . to disperse
themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations . . . remain or continue together by the
space of one hour after such command or request made by proclamation . . . shall suffer death
as in case of felony without benefit of clergy.”). The First Militia Act of 1792, entitled Act To
Provide for Calling Forth the Militia, To Execute the Laws of Union, Suppress Insurrections,
and Repel Invasions, similarly granted the President the power to issue a proclamation “in
case of an insurrection in any state . . . [to] command such insurgents to disperse, and retire
peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited time.” Act To Provide for Calling Forth
the Militia, To Execute the Laws of Union, Suppress Insurrections, and Repel Invasions, ch.
28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795).
84 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949)).
85 See Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
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is not “likely to incite or produce such action.”86 However, while the
federal government cannot generally regulate speech based on its content,
it can enact reasonable, content-neutral restrictions on its time, place, and
manner.87 Additionally, some categories of speech are given limited or no
protection under the First Amendment.88 For example, some kinds of
speech are considered so harmful, so injurious by themselves, their very
utterance tending to incite an immediate retaliation or breach of the peace,
that they are deemed outside of the Constitution’s protection. Such words
are called “fighting words.”89
The fighting-words doctrine originated in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.90 Mr. Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, drew several
complaints from the residents of Rochester, New Hampshire, after
defaming various religious sects while proselytizing. After calling the city
marshal “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” Chaplinsky
was arrested and convicted under a state law that made it a crime to
“address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to any other person
who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any
offensive or derisive name.”91 Chaplinsky appealed his conviction and
challenged the law, arguing that the city ordinance violated his freedom
86

395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 787, 796 (1989) (holding that a
requirement to use sound amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city
due to persistent noise complaints from nearby residents was a content-neutral and reasonable
regulation of the place and manner of protected speech); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968) (upholding a restriction on expressive content and demonstrating that contentneutral restrictions may be upheld when the government has a compelling interest). The time,
place, and manner restrictions imposed on the freedom to speak and assemble differ based
upon the nature of the speaker’s chosen forum, which the Supreme Court has divided into
three categories: traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic forums.
When reviewing the constitutionality of government restrictions on speech in public and
designated forums, courts use strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, restrictions on free speech
must further a “compelling state interest” and must be narrowly tailored to meet the goals of
that interest. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
88 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”).
89 Id. at 572.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 569. But see Robert M. O’Neil, Rights in Conflict: The First Amendment’s Third
Century, 65 Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 17 (2002) (noting that Mr. Chaplinsky “maintained
that he had firmly but politely informed the officer that ‘You, sir, are damned in the eyes of
God’ and ‘no better than a racketeer’”).
87
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of speech under the First Amendment.92 However, in a unanimous
opinion, the Supreme Court held that Chaplinsky’s “fighting words”
incited an immediate breach of the peace,93 and consequently, they were
deemed unprotected speech under the First Amendment’s freedom of
speech clause. 94 Rather than evoking the Holmesian marketplace of
ideas,95 the Court instead considered Chaplinsky’s words “of such slight
social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them [was]
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”96 As the
Court explained, Chaplinsky’s epithets were “likely to provoke the
average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.” 97
Although Chaplinsky has never been overruled, the Supreme Court
narrowed its scope in later decisions. For example, in 1949 in Terminiello
v. Chicago, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Mr.
Terminiello, an ex-Catholic priest who had been convicted of breach of
the peace after delivering an anti-Semitic speech to the Christian Veterans
of America. 98 The Supreme Court reasoned that not only was the city
ordinance not limited to unprotected fighting words, but it also considered
whether Terminiello had invited dispute or brought about conditions of
unrest, rendering the ordinance overly broad.99 Justice Douglas famously
declared that “a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.”100
The Court reached a similar result in 1971, at the height of the Vietnam
War. In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of Paul Cohen for disturbing the peace in violation of

92

See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.
See id. at 573–74.
94 See Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its
Interment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129, 1129–30 (1993).
95 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
96 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
97 Id. at 574.
98 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 1–3, 6 (1949).
99 See id. at 4–5.
100 Id. at 4.
93
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California law by wearing a jacket displaying the words “Fuck the Draft”
in a Los Angeles courthouse.101 The Court noted that the words on
Cohen’s jacket were not a direct personal insult aimed at a specific person
and thus could not be deemed fighting words. 102 Justice Harlan
concluded, “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric. . . . [T]he Constitution
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”103 Some
argue that an underlying tension between Chaplinsky and Cohen—the
former punishing public vulgarities and the latter allowing them—has
bred confusion on “defining the line between protected speech and
unprotected epithets.”104 Nevertheless, the fighting-words doctrine has
repeatedly been invoked in state courts, particularly following
tempestuous encounters between citizens and the police.105
IV. POLICE OFFICERS AND BLACK BODIES
In matters involving public protests toward the perceived racist actions
of police officers, the fighting-words doctrine raises important questions
about the limits of constitutional protection for Black and Brown citizens.
Cases like Lewis v. City of New Orleans (1974) and City of Houston v.
Hill (1987), which both overturned convictions based upon local laws
prohibiting the interruption of policing work with offensive language, 106
101

403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
See id. at 20.
103 Id. at 25.
104 O’Neil, supra note 91, at 16.
105 See infra note 106.
106 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 451 (1987); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130, 130 (1974); see also Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2013) (flashing
“the finger” at a police officer not deemed probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest);
Posr v. Court Officer Shield # 207, 180 F.3d 409, 415 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating to a police officer,
“One day you’re gonna get yours,” unaccompanied by any other action, would not rise to the
level of fighting words); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1990) (calling
a police officer an “asshole” did not constitute fighting words); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904
F.2d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir. 1990) (delivering rude gestures and cursing at a police officer in
Spanish not deemed fighting words); R.I.T. v. State, 675 So. 2d 97, 100 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995) (uttering “fuck you” to a police officer did not rise to the level of fighting words); In re.
Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419–20 (Minn. 1978) (reversing conviction for yelling to
police, “fuck you pigs”); Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274, 1276, 1284 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2000) (reversing conviction for violating statute prohibiting “public profanity” by
stating, “I’m tired of this God d––– police sticking their nose in s––– that doesn’t even involve
them”); Harrington v. City of Tulsa, 763 P.2d 700, 700–02 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (reversing
conviction of defendant who stated to police officers, “You’re such an ass” and “You mother
f—ers, you can’t—you’re not brave enough to go out and catch murders and robbers. You are
a couple of pussies”).
102
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affirm a sense that “the First Amendment protects a significant amount of
verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.”107 In fact, many
courts have argued that police officers should be held to a higher standard
when exercising their policing power against those merely speaking. In
Marttila v. City of Lynchburg (2000), a Virginia Court of Appeals
overturned the conviction of a defendant who called police officers
“fucking pigs” and indicated they “should be at a fucking donut shop.”108
The court declared that “the First Amendment requires properly trained
police officers to exercise a higher degree of restraint when confronted by
disorderly conduct and abusive language.”109
Some state and local governments have responded to such concerns by
simply limiting the range of public speech that can be criminalized to only
include “fighting words,” effectively granting police officers
discretionary authority to determine what kinds of activities or public
speech amount to criminal conduct. In other words, legislatures have
bypassed wrestling with the underlying racial tensions between law
enforcement and minoritized communities by avoiding acknowledging
the prevalence of implicit racial bias among police officers altogether. 110
Rather than question why police officers routinely use pepper spray, tear
gas, rubber bullets, and other violent policing tactics in response to
peaceful public protest about racial injustice, the doctrine threatens to
punish people who anger police officers with their free speech. 111 As a

107

Hill, 482 U.S. at 461.
535 S.E.2d 693, 693, 695 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
109 Id. at 697–98 n.5.
110 See Lois James, The Stability of Implicit Racial Bias in Police Officers, 21 Police Q. 30,
47 (2018) (demonstrating through empirical analysis that “[a]lthough officers did tend to
either moderately or strongly associate Black Americans with weapons, implicit racial bias
varied significantly within the same officers over time,” which “suggests that implicit racial
bias is not a stable trait . . . [and] training designed to reduce bias is not doomed to failure”).
111 Sottek, supra note 78 (noting several examples of police brutality: “A New York City
police officer tore a protective mask off of a young black man and assaulted him with pepper
spray while the victim peacefully stood with his hands up[.] . . . San Antonio Police used tear
gas against people. So did Dallas police. So did Los Angeles police. So did DC
police. . . . MSNBC host Ali Velshi says he was shot after state police fired unprovoked into
a peaceful rally”); Black Lives Matter Protests: Mapping Police Violence Across the USA,
Amnesty Int’l, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/usa-unlawful-use-of-forceby-police-at-black-lives-matter-protests/
[https://perma.cc/TFB2-PU6T]
(“Amnesty
International has documented 125 separate incidents of police violence against protesters in
40 states and the District of Columbia between 26 May and 5 June 2020. These acts of
excessive force were committed by members of state and local police departments, as well as
by National Guard troops and security force personnel from several federal agencies.”).
108
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result, a sense of confusion remains, especially regarding public speech
that decries racism at the hands of the police. Could the phrase “Black
Lives Matter” and similar expressions that either affirm the dignity of
Black lives or decry the injustice of institutional racism be deemed
“fighting words” by police officers?
Some courts have held that public expressions of dissent to law
enforcement can constitute fighting words.112 For example, in State v.
Clay (1999), the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for
disorderly conduct under Minnesota law based upon “fighting words”
directed toward police officers.113 Minnesota police officers identified
Nathan Webb Clay as a suspect in a local fight.114 After approaching and
questioning Mr. Clay, the suspect proceeded to call one officer a “white
racist motherf**ker” and accused another of racism before telling both
officers “that he wished their mothers would die.”115 The officers arrested
Clay, and the district court found him guilty of disorderly conduct.116 The
court of appeals examined whether Clay’s speech, viewed in light of the
surrounding circumstances (including the fact that it was Mother’s Day
weekend), would likely provoke retaliatory violence by police officers. 117
The court ultimately held that Clay’s speech did in fact rise to the level of
fighting words, stating that “appellant’s language was directed at the
officers and was not merely the expression of a controversial opinion;
while calling the officers ‘white racist motherf**kers’ may be protected,
wishing death upon an officer’s mother is not.”118
Critical Race Theorists have argued that such tensions in the
implications of verbal expressions between officers and citizens reflect
“the cultural structures of masculinity in the contemporary AngloSee, e.g., State v. Griatzky, 587 A.2d 234, 238 (Me. 1991) (holding that “abusive
language challenging the officer’s authority and implicitly exhorting the assembled group to
join in that challenge and to resist the order to disperse . . . presented a clear and present danger
of an immediate breach of the peace even when directed toward a police officer”); State v.
York, 732 A.2d 859, 861–62 (Me. 1999) (holding that calling court security officers “fucking
assholes” and preparing to spit on the officer would “have a direct tendency to cause a violent
response by an ordinary person”).
113 See State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14,
1999) (“The district court found that . . . the appellant’s words were sufficiently egregious to
provoke retaliatory police violence.”).
114 See id. at *1.
115 Id.
116 See id.
117 See id. at *2–3.
118 Id. at *3.
112
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American world,” causing “[m]en disempowered by racial or class status”
to seek “ways of proving their manhood,” in some instances with
violence.119 According to Angela P. Harris, among the men who
predominate crime, criminal justice, and policing, “violent acts
are . . . sometimes[] the result of the character of masculinity itself as a
cultural ideal . . . [where] men use violence or the threat of
violence . . . when they perceive their masculine self-identity to be under
attack.”120 Some scholars argue that such identity performance theories of
American masculinity find roots in the “culture of honor” among white
males in the American South,121 where an “ethic of self-protection”
among early frontier herdsmen in an atmosphere of lawlessness made it
“important to establish one’s reputation for toughness—even on matters
that might seem small on the surface.”122
Such “culture-of-honor norms” are not only embodied in the laws and
public policies of the American South,123 but they have also influenced
police departments across the country. Law enforcement officers who
pledge an oath of honor often enact a “hypermasculine” cultural image of
policing embodied by the man who is “tough and violent, yet heroic,
protective, and necessary to society’s very survival.”124 As Frank Rudy
Cooper further explains, the working-class status of many male police
officers catalyzes their hypermasculinity with efforts to mitigate their
subordinate class status through aggressive, authoritative, and even
violent policing.125

119 Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 777,
780 (2000).
120 Id. at 781.
121 Dov Cohen, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdle & Norbert Schwarz, Insult, Aggression,
and the Southern Culture of Honor: An “Experimental Ethnography”, 70 J. Personality & Soc.
Psych. 945, 946 (1996) (“White male homicide rates of the South are higher than those of the
North, and the South exceeds the North only in homicides that are argument- or conflictrelated, not in homicides that are committed while another felony, such as robbery or burglary,
is being performed. Such findings are consistent with a stronger emphasis on honor and
protection in the South.”).
122 Id. at 946; see also id. (“In the Old South, allowing oneself to be pushed around or
affronted without retaliation amounted to admitting that one was an easy mark and could be
taken advantage of.”).
123 Id.; see also id. (this culture is “reflected in looser gun control laws, less restrictive selfdefense statutes, and more hawkish voting by federal legislators on foreign policy issues”).
124 See Harris, supra note 119, at 793.
125 Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police
Training, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 671, 691–92 (2009); Harris, supra note 119, at 794 (“Beat
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One might conclude that it was therefore a performative culture of
hypermasculinity that provoked the police officers in Clay, and not the
underlying racial tensions stoked by Mr. Clay’s proclamation that the
officers were “white racist motherf**kers.”126 Perhaps yelling “yo mama”
to a police officer, or in Mr. Clay’s case, calling for an officer’s mother’s
death, should appropriately be deemed fighting words because “street
policing is deeply steeped in a masculine culture” and “violence is always
just below the surface.”127 However, Angela P. Harris argues that racial,
ethnic, and class divides trigger different expressions of masculinity that
reflect power struggles among men and mediate conflicts in social life.128
Policing—even when characterized by expressions of hypermasculinity
—“follows the vectors of power established in the larger society in which
white dominates nonwhite and rich dominates poor.”129 Further, “the
instability of masculine identity,” due to a racialized yet amorphous
societal power structure, renders the prospect of violence between citizens
and police as an ever-present defense mechanism.130 Accordingly,
clarifying when anti-racist speech that provokes retaliatory violence
should be protected, and when such speech should be viewed as mere
contestations of gender performativity, would help to make sense of the
racial coordinates that comprise society’s vectors of power.
By ignoring these underlying questions of agency and ascription in
racial identity—how one chooses to perform their racial and gender
identity versus how their identity performance is perceived—courts have
published seemingly inconsistent conclusions about the meaning of
fighting words. Unlike Clay, some courts have held expressions of dissent

cops tend to be working-class men, men denied the masculinity of wealth, power, and order
giving.”).
126 State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999).
127 Harris, supra note 119, at 794, 796.
128 See id. at 784 (“The relations between white and black men, then, are more complex than
‘dominant’ and ‘subordinate’; men divided by racial power may look at one another with
admiration, envy, or desire.”).
129 Id. at 797.
130 Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon
Martin, George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 Calif. L. Rev.
1027, 1039 (2014); see Harris, supra note 119, at 788 (“Men must constantly defend
themselves against both women and other men in order to be accepted as men; their gender
identity, crucial to their psychological sense of wholeness, is constantly in doubt. . . . [U]nder
these circumstances, gender performance frequently becomes gender violence.”).
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to law enforcement during policing encounters tinged by acts of racial
bias as not constituting fighting words.131
In the case of Johnson v. Campbell (2003), the Third Circuit reversed
a lower court’s finding that the arrest of an African American man for
disorderly conduct was constitutional.132 Mr. Steven Johnson was a high
school basketball coach who was staying in a motel with his team in
Delaware before the start of a tournament. 133 Johnson was reported to
Delaware police by a motel employee for flipping through free
newspapers in the motel’s guest office.134 The employee explained that
Mr. Johnson made her nervous because the motel had been robbed five
months prior by two young Black men.135 According to the employee,
“the way [Mr. Johnson] was walking and pacing around the office and his
body language” scared her. 136 Upon arrival, a police officer located Mr.
Johnson reading a newspaper inside of a parked car outside of the motel
and attempted to detain him.137 Mr. Johnson did not comply with requests
to show identification, and after calling the police officer a “son of a
bitch,” Mr. Johnson was placed under arrest for his use of profane
language and disturbance of the peace. 138 The court of appeals held that
Mr. Johnson’s constitutional rights had been violated because his words
did not amount to fighting words, explaining that “Johnson’s words were
unpleasant, insulting, and possibly unwise, but they were not intended to,
nor did they, cause a fight.”139

131

See, e.g., Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
plaintiff “brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officer, Officer Erik
Campbell, asserting that Campbell had violated his constitutional rights by detaining and
arresting him without cause and due to his race”); Cornelious v. Brubaker, No.
01CV1254,2003 WL 21511125, at *2, *9 (D. Minn. June 25, 2003) (after yelling “‘fuck you
all’ to Officer Brubaker and Anaya, who were across the street from him[,] . . . Cornelious
was called a ‘nigger’ while he was hit and kicked on the ground by Officer Brubaker, Gardner,
and Anaya”); United States v. McDermott, 971 F. Supp. 939, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Brendle v.
City of Houston, 759 So. 2d 1274, 1284 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
132 Johnson, 332 F.3d at 215; see also id. at 213 (explaining that “swear words, spoken to a
police officer, do not provide probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct because the
words, as a matter of law, are not ‘fighting words’”).
133 See id. at 201–02.
134 See id. at 202.
135 See id.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 203.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 213–15.
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The difficulty that courts have faced in determining whether the
Constitution protects public protests of perceived racist policing suggests
that the notion of anti-racist speech as fighting words is still up for debate.
Perhaps one reason for such ambiguity arises from the very concept of
disorderly conduct, an inherently racially biased idea.140 In many Black
and Brown communities, police supervision has become a part of
everyday life, whether employed to threaten misbehaving students in
school,141 marginalize Black girls in the classroom,142 or reprimand
homeless people sleeping on the street.143 As Paul Gowder explains,
citizen acts that undermine the command mode of police authority—or
the social order—become a threat to order-maintenance policing—or an
instance of social disorder.144 When anti-racist speech threatens the
commonplace nature of police supervisory authority—even when
delivered in response to unjustified, yet ubiquitous, police aggression—it
is reasonable to presume that police officers will perceive such language
as “fighting words” that incite an immediate breach of the hierarchical
social order.
Another reason for the ambiguity of anti-racist speech as fighting
words arises from the criminalization of disobedience to police orders.
Not only do citizens struggle to determine when policing tactics are

140

See Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 20) (on file with author).
141 See Julie Kiernan Coon & Lawrence F. Travis III, The Role of Police in Public Schools:
A Comparison of Principal and Police Reports of Activities in Schools, 13 Police Prac. &
Rsch. 15, 18 (2012); Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93
Wash. U. L. Rev. 919, 922 (2016) (“For example, police officers stationed at schools have
arrested students for texting, passing gas in class, violating the school dress code, stealing two
dollars from a classmate, bringing a cell phone to class, arriving late to school, or telling
classmates waiting in the school lunch line that he would ‘get them’ if they ate all of the
potatoes.”).
142 See Erica L. Green, Mark Walker & Eliza Shapiro, ‘A Battle for the Souls of Black
Girls’, N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/us/politics/blackgirls-school-discipline.html [https://perma.cc/Y4AT-7UQH] (“A New York Times analysis
of the most recent discipline data from the Education Department found that Black girls are
over five times more likely than white girls to be suspended at least once from school, seven
times more likely to receive multiple out-of-school suspensions than white girls and three
times more likely to receive referrals to law enforcement.”).
143 See Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of Sight—
Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalization of Homelessness, 6 Geo. J.
on Poverty L. & Pol’y 145, 146–47 (1999).
144 See Gowder, supra note 25, at 13–14.
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lawful,145 but they also face the risk of bodily harm, or even worse, death,
if they disobey a police order to challenge perceived unlawful conduct. 146
Further, civil rights lawsuits alleging violations of constitutional rights by
police officers must confront the blue wall of silence,147 the weaponry of
indemnification policies148 and police unions,149 and the protective shield
of the qualified-immunity defense.150 The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects police officers from suit unless the aggrieved party can show that
the officer violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable [police officer] would have known.”151 Following
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pearson v. Callahan (2009), which held
that courts can first decide whether a constitutional right was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged misconduct before determining
whether the alleged facts constitute a violation of a constitutional right,152
it seems that courts can simply rule that a police officer did not violate a
“clearly established” constitutional right by arresting a citizen for antiracist speech that disturbs the peace. If courts dismiss a suit on such
grounds, the underlying question of whether such anti-racist speech is
protected under the First Amendment remains unresolved.
Put another way, when investigating police officer liability for a
claimed violation of First Amendment rights, courts do not have to
resolve whether anti-racist speech unjustifiably become “fighting words”
145 Orin Kerr, Sandra Bland and the ‘Lawful Order’ Problem, Wash. Post (July 23, 2015,
11:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/sandra-bland-and-the-lawful-order-problem/ [https://perma.cc/WM4K-GGG8].
146 See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 315–16 (2016).
147 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias
and Motive To Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233, 237–40 (1998).
148 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885, 890 (2014)
(“Police officers are virtually always indemnified.”).
149 See Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 712,
747–58 (2017).
150 See, e.g., Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
defendant officer was entitled to qualified immunity because his violation of the plaintiff’s
First Amendment constitutional rights was a “reasonable mistake”); Carbado, supra note 22,
at 1519–23.
151 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Some argue that such protections trace
their origin to the Casual Killing Act of 1669, a Virginia law that exempted slave masters and
those under their instruction from the charge of murder, if their slaves were killed during the
administration of extreme punishment, because malice could not be presumed. See An Act
About the Casuall Killing of Slaves, in 2 The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the
Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619, at 270, 270
(William Waller Hening ed., 1823).
152 555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009).

COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2020]

Blackness as Fighting Words

153

in the minds of officers who suppress such speech or retaliate with
violence. Courts can simply assert that anti-racist protest speech is not a
clearly established form of protected speech under the Constitution
because some citizens, including some police officers, might reasonably
interpret them—e.g., protestors shouting “Black Lives Matter”—as
harmful words that provoke an immediate breach of the peace. To be sure,
a rich legacy of white supremacist ideology woven into the fabric of
American culture underscores the “reasonableness” of perceiving antiracist pure speech—spoken or written words—as a threat to the status
quo, especially a status quo typified by order-maintenance policing. Even
more, history reveals that the unconstrained Black body in the public
square is often perceived as a threat to white supremacy, rendering
Blackness itself a kind of symbolic speech that becomes “fighting words”
in the minds of some citizens. The caricature of the Black American man
as a “brute” provides but one example.
While enslaved Africans were typically portrayed as childlike and
docile to assuage the moral angst of their white masters, free Black
citizens were thought to be driven by animalistic tendencies and savage
instincts. Not only were Black Americans after the abolition of slavery
characterized as “lazy, thriftless, intemperate, insolent, dishonest, and
without the most rudimentary elements of morality,”153 but Black men in
particular were deemed brutes—a man “lurking in the dark, a monstrous
beast, crazed with lust. His ferocity is almost demoniacal.”154 In fact, the
claim that Black men were brutally raping white women was used to
justify their torture and lynching during the Reconstruction era and well
into the twentieth century. According to Barbara Holden-Smith, victims
of public lynching by mobs “were tied to trees and while the funeral pyres
were being prepared, they were forced to hold out their hands while one
finger at a time was chopped off. The fingers were distributed as
souvenirs.”155
The racist culture of characterizing Black men as criminal and savage
brutes to justify their harsh treatment and public lynching persists to this

Thomas Nelson Page, The Negro: The Southerner’s Problem 80 (1910).
George T. Winston, The Relations of the Whites to the Negroes, 18 Annals Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 105, 109 (1901).
155 Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and Gender
in the Progressive Era, 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 31, 31 (1996) (quoting Lynched Negro and
Wife Were First Mutilated, Vicksburg (Miss.) Evening Post, Feb. 8, 1904, in Ralph Ginzburg,
100 Years of Lynching 62–63 (1969)).
153
154
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day. For example, in 2014, Officer Darren Wilson described the eighteenyear-old Michael Brown as a superhuman “demon” that looked
“aggressive” and “hostile” to clarify why he shot the Black teenager after
Brown had been suspected of stealing a box of Swisher Sweets from a
convenience store.156 Perhaps Brown’s unconstrained and dignified Black
body became symbolic speech in defiance of Wilson’s command mode of
police authority and consequently was deemed a threat to Wilson’s social
status.157 Is it no wonder that Amadou Diallo was shot at forty-one times
on suspicion of rape without uttering a single word?158
Perhaps this line of reasoning has an atmosphere of conjecture. After
all, charges for crimes like disturbing the police, interfering with public
officials, or inciting a riot are rarely decided by invoking the fightingwords doctrine. But maybe the threat of conviction for speaking one’s
mind is more than enough to sustain the racial status quo. Why else would
Black and Brown parents teach their children to passively comply with
police officer demands, even in the face of racially biased, aggressive, and
supervisory behavior?159 Why else would so many Black and Brown
Americans avoid the police altogether, even when the police are Black? 160
As Vesla Weaver explains, the prospect of being reprimanded for
peaceful protests against unlawful police behavior turns the criminal
justice system into “a site of racial learning” where minoritized citizens
are socialized into the extant racial social order. 161 Unfortunately, when
citizens remain silent to racist policing out of fear for their safety, they
Jamelle Bouie, Michael Brown Wasn’t a Superhuman Demon, Slate (Nov. 26, 2014,
12:07 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/11/darren-wilsons-racial-portrayal-ofmichael-brown-as-a-superhuman-demon-the-ferguson-police-officers-account-is-a-commonprojection-of-racial-fears.html [https://perma.cc/6H33-2F56] (quoting Wilson’s grand jury
testimony and his interview with police).
157 As Angela P. Harris explains, the stereotypical savage Black male can be perceived as a
threat to the masculinity of white police officers. See Harris, supra note 119, at 798–99.
158 New York City is no stranger to the culture of violent policing of Black and Brown
citizens. See, e.g., Marilynn Johnson, Street Justice: A History of Police Violence in New
York City 18–19 (2003).
159 See Tracy R. Whitaker & Cudore L. Snell, Parenting While Powerless: Consequences
of “the Talk”, 26 J. Hum. Behav. Soc. Env’t 303, 304 (2016).
160 See Weaver et al., supra note 24, at 13–14; German Lopez, How Systemic Racism
Entangles All Police Officers—Even Black Cops, Vox (Aug. 15, 2016, 9:35 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2015/5/7/8562077/police-racism-implicit-bias (revealing that a Black
police office admitted “that after decades of working at the Baltimore Police Department and
Maryland State Police, he harbored a strong bias against young black men”).
161 Vesla M. Weaver, Black Citizenship and Summary Punishment: A Brief History to the
Present, 17 Theory & Event (2014).
156
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not only waive Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, but they also
experience a deprivation of liberty that degrades their citizenship by
robbing them of agency to define their own identity performativity.162 Yet
when citizens protest aggressive policing, such as those who march in
BLM protests to decry the brutal police killings of George Floyd and
Breonna Taylor and so many others, they risk their Blackness being
perceived as a threat and inducing a violent police response. This loselose situation, which undoubtedly will trigger a chilling effect on
constitutional free speech,163 perhaps explains why protestors who shout
“Black Lives Matter” in affirmation of Black humanity are quickly met
by heavily armed police officers ready for a fight.164 Their Blackness is
deemed fighting words.
To be sure, there are myriad reasons why anger might surface at the
mere sound of BLM protestors marching down the street. In his treatise
on the art of persuasion, Rhetoric, Aristotle defines anger as “desire,
accompanied with pain, for conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight
that was directed against oneself or those near to one, when such a slight
is undeserved.”165 Perhaps when white citizens or white police officers
find themselves as the subject of an injustice that sits in the belly of
American history, far beyond their reach, some perceive an undeserved
“slight,” a disregard for and deprivation of their moral desert that is
painful because it undermines their moral worth.166 Perhaps from such
See Toussaint, supra note 35, at 380 (noting that “political equality requires not only
civil rights protecting one’s freedom from interference, but even more, it calls for public
autonomy—freedom from domination”); Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the
Law: Three Approaches, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37, 43 (2009).
163 See Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1633, 1650 (2013) (“[T]he government is under a duty not only to refrain from regulating
protected expression but also to promote it. At the same time, freedom of expression is also a
preferred value, such that, when it conflicts with other state values—such as the interest in
regulating unprotected expression—it must receive more weight.” (footnotes omitted)).
164 An online spreadsheet reveals more than 1000 videos of recent instances of police
brutality directed against non-violent protesters. T. Greg Doucette & Jason E. Miller,
GeorgeFloyd Protest—Police Brutality Videos on Twitter, Google Docs, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/u/1/d/1YmZeSxpz52qT-10tkCjWOwOGkQqle7Wd1P7ZM1wMW0E/htmlview?pru=AAABcql6DI8*mIHYeMnoj9XWUp3Svb_KZA# [https://perma.cc/2V8R-BXGL] (last visited Oct. 17, 2020).
165 Aristotle’s
Rhetoric, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (Feb. 1, 2010),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/index.html [https://perma.cc/N358-A2Z6].
166 Aristotle, Rhetoric bk. II, ch. 2 (J.H. Freese ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926),
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Rh.+2.2&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060 [https://perma.cc/4NS9-5JB7] (“Slighting is an actualization of
opinion in regard to something which appears valueless; for things which are really bad or
162
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pain arises a hasty and irrational desire for revenge, for a rectificatory
justice that remedies a seemingly unequal distribution of harm caused by
the follies of our ancestors. Yet when neither the perceived offender nor
the recipient of the perceived undeserved slight is the source of the
injustice that animates their despair, the resulting brawl only deepens the
wounds they share. Rather than inflict the specific pain of regret in the
body of the other, such acts of revenge in response to anti-racist speech
simply deepen the wounds of racial division resonant in the body politic.
At this point in the analysis, an underlying and unresolved tension in
the First Amendment’s treatment of racial issues remains unanswered—
is the phrase Black Lives Matter or its symbolic representation in the
bodies of Black protestors lining the streets of America unprotected
public speech? Is Blackness “fighting words”? Perhaps the inconsistency
among courts on the meaning of fighting words, coupled with the
protections afforded police officers by the qualified immunity doctrine,
explains why George Floyd’s protest against the brutal policing tactics of
Officer Derek Chauvin while lying on a Minnesota street—Mr. Floyd
declaring with muffled voice, “Please, please, please, I can’t breathe”—
was met by Officer Chauvin’s knee pressed ever more firmly upon Mr.
Floyd’s neck for eight minutes and forty-six seconds.167 Perhaps Mr.
Floyd’s plea for dignity as a Black man under arrest in America was
simply deemed the fighting words of an American brute. 168

good, or tend to become so, we consider worthy of attention, but those which are of no
importance or trifling we ignore. Now there are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and
insult.”).
167 Elisha Fieldstadt, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Man Dies After Pleading with Officer Attempting
To Detain Him in Minneapolis, NBC News (May 26, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-dies-after-pleading-i-can-t-breathe-during-arrest-n1214586 [https://perma.cc/ZF7S-XJT7]. This time (eight minutes and forty-six seconds) is disputed. See Evan Hill
et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/Y3YT-N5JL].
168 Although beyond the scope of this Essay, this argument also suggests an underexplored
tension between (a) the First Amendment’s lack of protection for “fighting words” that
threaten harm to their target and an imminent breach of the peace, and (b) the Fourth
Amendment’s permission of deadly force by police officers in response to an imminent threat
of serious bodily harm to themselves or others. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715,
1723 (2019) (holding that the presence of probable cause for an arrest defeats a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim as a matter of law).
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V. BLACK LIVES AND IMMINENT LAWLESSNESS
Unfortunately, Justice William Brennan got it wrong in Texas v.
Johnson when he said that “the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable.”169 The government does prohibit the free expression of
certain ideas that society finds offensive or disagreeable. Maybe this
explains why federal and local governments, and their police officers,
have silenced protestors with curfews and threats of arrest, 170 all while
onlookers yell in retort, “All Lives Matter.”171 Maybe this explains why
the very idea of liberty and equality for Black and Brown Americans,172
the very notion of Black lives deserving human moral dignity,173 the very
suggestion of a Black feminist lens to critique socioeconomic injustice,174
169

491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
See Devlin Barrett, Cities Increasingly Turn to Curfews Hoping To Subdue Violence,
Retake Control of the Streets, Wash. Post (June 1, 2020, 6:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/curfew-george-floyd-protestsminneapolis-washington-new-york/2020/06/01/0d58b638-a44d-11ea-b6193f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/7ZWD-PQUU]; Mark Berman & Emily WaxThibodeaux, Police Keep Using Force Against Peaceful Protesters, Prompting Sustained
Criticism About Tactics and Training, Wash. Post (June 4, 2020, 1:02 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-keep-using-force-against-peacefulprotesters-prompting-sustained-criticism-about-tactics-and-training/2020/06/03/5d2f51d4a5cf-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html [https://perma.cc/YT8B-GQ7D]; Alex Woodward,
Louisville Police Threaten Protesters with Arrests, Tear Gas in Wake of Breonna Taylor
Grand Jury, Independent (Sept. 23, 2020, 11:33 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/breonna-taylor-protests-louisville-grand-jury-teargas-latest-b559656.html [https://perma.cc/AF6L-Q3RF]; Natasha Lennard, The President’s War on Dissent Is
Using Trumped-Up Federal Charges, Intercept (Oct. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/10/31/protests-federal-charges-trump/ [https://perma.cc/FT74P469].
171 Daniel Victor, Why ‘All Lives Matter’ Is Such a Perilous Phrase, N.Y. Times (July
15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/us/all-lives-matter-black-lives-matter.html
[https://perma.cc/BKW9-A95F].
172 See Stokely Carmichael & Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation
in America 77 (1992) (“The [American] Creed is supposed to contain considerations of
equality and liberty, at least certainly equal opportunity, and justice. The fact is, of course, that
these are simply words which were not even originally intended to have applicability to black
people . . . .”).
173 See Austin Channing Brown, I’m Still Here: Black Dignity in a World Made for
Whiteness 79–80 (2018) (“We must remind ourselves and one another that we are fearfully
and wonderfully made, arming ourselves against the ultimate message of whiteness—that we
are inferior.”).
174 See Patricia Hill Collins, Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice, at
xvi (1998) (“Despite long-standing claims by elites that Blacks, women, Latinos, and other
similarly derogated groups in the United States remain incapable of producing the type of
170
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is often suppressed in mainstream discourse as the ideas of a lunatic
fringe. Maybe it is the very idea of Blackness as something other than
property that becomes fighting words in the eyes of American
exceptionalism; a type of symbolic speech so harmful to white
supremacy, so capable of inciting imminent lawless action, so disruptive
of order-maintenance policing, that it is deemed a peril to the veil of white
supremacy that looms over the American constitutional order, and
consequently, is prohibited from the public square. Maybe this explains
why police officers arrive to BLM protests with guns and tanks and
shields and gas, long before the first stone has been thrown or the first
rallying cry has been sung.
Maybe it is Blackness as fighting words that explains why some police
officers believe they are authorized to use brutal force when citizens
“insult” them with anti-racist rhetoric. Officer Sunil Dutta declared in a
Washington Post opinion editorial in 2014, “[I]f you don’t want to get
shot, tased, pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to the ground,
just do what I tell you.”175 Such statements are not viewed as irrational
articulations of implicit bias and deeply harbored racist ideas in policing
culture, but instead they are deemed rational responses to disorderly
behavior that reassert police authority,176 limit resistance to law and
order, 177 and instill fear among the citizenry that deters criminal activity.
Yet Daria Roithmayr argues that such rationality is dubious; aggressive
policing weakens community trust and undermines police legitimacy,

interpretive, analytical thought that is labeled theory in the West, powerful knowledges of
resistance that toppled former structures of social inequality repudiate this view.”).
175 Sunil Dutta, I’m a Cop. If You Don’t Want To Get Hurt, Don’t Challenge Me., Wash.
Post (Aug. 19, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-dont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ [https://perma.cc/JWR2DC4B].
176 See, e.g., Paul J. Hirschfield & Daniella Simon, Legitimating Police Violence:
Newspaper Narratives of Deadly Force, 14 Theoretical Criminology 155, 155 (2010) (noting
how newspapers often “cast victims of police killings as physical and social threats and situate
[police-perpetrated homicides] within legitimate institutional roles”); Jasmine R. Silver, Sean
Patrick Roche, Thomas J. Bilach & Stephanie Bontrager Ryon, Traditional Police Culture,
Use of Force, and Procedural Justice: Investigating Individual, Organizational, and Contextual
Factors, 34 Just. Q. 1272, 1275 (2017) (“Officers may also feel a desire to ‘maintain the edge’
against citizens by refusing to back down, even in response to verbal resistance, by
demonstrating their authority whenever possible.” (citations omitted)).
177 See, e.g., Paul K. Huth, Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and
Theoretical Debates, 2 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 25, 26–27 (1999).
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provoking dissent that merely leads to further aggression by police
officers, a vicious cycle.178
Maybe it is Blackness as fighting words that explains why some
protests seem to inevitably devolve into the socially destructive and selfdefeating act of rioting—“[a]n unlawful disturbance of the peace by [a
crowd].”179 To be sure, in many instances, it is extremists who seek to
exploit peaceful protests for their own political ends.180 But maybe, in
other cases, America has simply failed to hear Black America speak.
Maybe, as Martin Luther King, Jr., suggested in 1967,
It has failed to hear that the plight of the Negro poor has worsened over
the last few years. It has failed to hear that the promises of freedom and
justice have not been met. And it has failed to hear that large segments
of white society are more concerned about tranquility and the status quo
than about justice, equality, and humanity.181

After all, America boasts a rich legacy of violating the First
Amendment rights of Black protestors. During the height of the Civil
Rights Movement, across the segregated South, thousands of Black
protestors were jailed for peacefully marching in dissent to a statesponsored system of racial oppression.182 Indeed, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
was arrested and jailed in Birmingham, Alabama, in April 1963 for
engaging in coordinated non-violent marches, sit-ins, and prayers in
defiance of nationwide policies of racial segregation.183 While
imprisoned, King wrote the Letter from Birmingham Jail, in which he
famously declared, “We know through painful experience that freedom is
never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the
oppressed.”184 However, before a demand can be answered, it must be
heard.
178

See Daria Roithmayr, The Dynamics of Excessive Force, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 407,
424–26.
179 Riot, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
180 See Neil MacFarquhar, Many Claim Extremists Are Sparking Protest Violence. But
Which Extremists?, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-protests-white-supremacists-antifa.html [https://perma.cc/RY2Y-9NXP].
181 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Other America, Address at Stanford University (Apr. 14,
1967), https://www.crmvet.org/docs/otheram.htm [https://perma.cc/QJ9E-FMBL].
182 See generally Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63
(1988) (describing challenges that protestors endured during the Civil Rights Movement
between the years 1954 and 1963).
183 Id. at 730–31.
184 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail 5 (Apr. 16, 1963).
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We’ve been told that to be Black and poor in America is to speak the
language of the unheard. But maybe not. Maybe to be Black and poor in
America is to merely represent a subset of a larger faction of citizens
whose identity is altogether silenced, a faction of citizens whose speech
is deemed unworthy of constitutional protection because it will
undeniably stir a fight in the heart of white supremacy. Maybe to be Black
and poor in America is to have one’s voice, one’s protests, one’s identity
be given such slight social value as to always be outweighed by the
immediate threat and direct harm to the preservation of the racial status
quo, the privileges and “qualified immunities” of whiteness.185 Indeed,
even if one believes that the First Amendment, in theory, protects the free
speech of Black citizens, the discretionary power granted to police
officers to adjudicate such rights, in practice, renders freedom of speech
in America a sham.
If we truly believe that Black Lives Matter, we must reckon with the
anguish and guilt borne from America’s legacy of racial oppression, rival
emotions that have shaped a toxic relationship between Black Americans
and the police.186 Assertions of Black humanity have long ignited the rage
of the patrol. And assemblies in defiance of white supremacy have long
triggered breaches of the peace. Even more, we must protest the inequities
that a racist color-consciousness has forged across the American
landscape. We must embrace the human moral dignity of Black lives,
even if it provokes anger in the heart of the privileged.187 While some
argue that such public displays of emotion are futile, undermining
progress by “introducing or reinforcing divisions, hierarchies, and forms
of neglect or obtuseness,”188 Audre Lorde clarifies the moral utility of
anger, declaring,
[A]nger between peers births change, not destruction, and the
discomfort and sense of loss it often causes is not fatal, but a sign of
185

See generally Timothy C. Shiell, African Americans and the First Amendment: The Case
for Liberty and Equality 33 (2019) (analyzing American suppression of dissent against the
status quo); see also Hansford, supra note 19, at 688 (“When ideas on race that would disrupt
the racial hierarchy of white over Black emerge, the First Amendment is disproportionately
applied to trample that dissent.”).
186 See Girardeau A. Spann, Race Ipsa Loquitur, 2018 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1025, 1052
(pointing out that “the United States criminal justice system is characterized by racial
disparities that are stark, pervasive, intentional, and often fatal”).
187 See Alexander, supra note 53, at 12–13; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 387 (1987).
188 Martha C. Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 2 (2013).
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growth. My response to racism is anger. . . . It has served me as fire in
the ice zone of uncomprehending eyes . . . [that] see in my experience
and the experience of my people only new reasons for fear or guilt.189

In other words, anger confers a sense of power and agency to harmed
citizens as they wade through a messy and uncertain world. Our challenge
lies not in squelching anger but in channeling such power toward
constructive ends.
Finally, we must wrestle with the unresolved racial subtext of modern
policing, a culture that exploits the ambiguities of the First Amendment
to silence the legitimate public protests of minoritized citizens. Too often,
police officers appear as mere instruments of the state when they respond
to collective moral dissent with brutal violence.190 Rather than stand idle
or encourage protestors to retreat in fear of their safety, we must learn to
embrace the pain of America’s past as a catalyst for collective healing, “a
tension in the mind” that can help us rise “from the dark depths of
prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and
brotherhood.”191 In other words, if Blackness has in fact become fighting
words, then we must fight back.
CONCLUSION
I learned at the age of fourteen that the police officers who killed
Amadou Diallo were all acquitted after three days of deliberation, a cruel
reminder of the power of whiteness in America.192 And I recently learned
that in 2015, one of Amadou’s killers was promoted to the rank of
sergeant, despite objections from Amadou’s mother. 193 Perhaps they

Audre Lorde, The Uses of Anger, 9 Women’s Stud. Q. 7, 9 (1981).
See generally Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment (1966) (describing
how the policing of protests during the Civil Rights Movement impacted the concept of free
speech in America); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law 477–78, 653–54
(4th ed. 2000) (an analysis of the role of race in American law and society, including
discussion on racial protests and police brutality); Jules Boykoff, Beyond Bullets: The
Suppression of Dissent in the United States 10–11 (2007) (revealing the tools used by
government to marginalize and suppress dissent, including violence at the hands of the police).
191 King, supra note 184, at 4.
192 See Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are
Acquitted
of
All
Charges,
N.Y.
Times
(Feb.
26,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-dialloshooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html [https://perma.cc/XCQ6-RFK7].
193 See Dean Meminger, NYPD Officer Involved in Death of Amadou Diallo Promoted,
Spectrum News (Dec. 18, 2015, 2:46 AM), https://www.ny1.com/nyc/all189
190
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never heard her protest after the street brawl had come to an end. After
all, when Amadou was killed, his mother did not have the modern
megaphone of Twitter to amplify her son’s name and mobilize the masses.
As for the protests currently making their way across the landscape,
some have argued that they are merely reflective of American history—
from the Boston Tea Party to the Revolutionary War to the Civil Rights
Movement.194 Notwithstanding, despite a history of racial oppression that
stands alongside the transformative power of collective dissent, maybe in
today’s America, the phrase “Black Lives Matter” and other forms of
public speech that affirm Black humanity have simply turned into fighting
words. If that is indeed the case, maybe we should reconsider the utility
of a policing culture that reinforces white privilege while promoting
Black subjugation. Maybe police abolition is in fact the answer. To be
sure, police abolition will likely occur as a gradual process of reform
within the context of rethinking the entire criminal justice system.195 But
the weight of history suggests that police reform may not be enough.196
In my view, one thing remains clear: if Blackness is fighting words,
then we should heed the words of Frederick Douglass preached at
Canandaigua, New York, on August 3, 1857:
If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor
freedom and yet depreciate agitation are men who want crops without
plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightning.
They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This
struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be
both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle.197

In other words, until that day of moral reckoning, until the majority of
Americans come to understand the reasonableness of a call to affirm
boroughs/news/2015/12/16/police-officer-involved-in-death-of-amadou-diallo-promoted
[https://perma.cc/QW7C-YHPY].
194 See Kellie Carter Jackson, The Double Standard of the American Riot, Atlantic (June 1,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/06/riots-are-american-way-georgefloyd-protests/612466/ [https://perma.cc/D6JC-PU8Z].
195 See Mariame Kaba, Police “Reforms” You Should Always Oppose, Truthout (Dec. 7,
2014),
https://truthout.org/articles/police-reforms-you-should-always-oppose/
[https://perma.cc/7WB6-PT3J].
196 See Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 406
(2018) (arguing that “policing as we now know it cannot be fixed”).
197 Frederick Douglass, Two Speeches by Frederick Douglass; One on West India
Emancipation, Delivered at Canandaigua, Aug. 4th, and the Other on the Dred Scott Decision,
Delivered in New York 22 (1857).
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Black humanity amidst the perpetual and unjustified assault on Black
lives, until the rain and thunder and lightning agitate a wounded American
consciousness and fragile American soul, folks who react to the words
“Black Lives Matter” with retaliatory violence can, as they say in the
South Bronx, “catch these hands.”

